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Whilst the Courts have long been able to set aside contracts falling within the
compass of what might be termed 'categories of unconscionability', I it appeared
after the House of Lords decision inNational Westminster Bank pIc v.Morgan2 that
there was a marked reluctance to see these discrete areas as part of a general
doctrine of unconscionability revolving around the notion of inequality of
bargaining power. However, recent decisions in the field of entertainment law
seem to suggest that ageneral principle may indeed be making a comeback via the
doctrine of restraint of trade. 3 Within these cases the lack of specialist advice and
the inequality of bargaining power between the parties have proved crucial, and
the Courts' decisions have appeared to support the notion of a general principle
that was advanced by Lord Denning in Lloyds Bank v. Bundy.4
Calls for a single unifying principle are by no means of purely modern origin. In
one of the earliest authorities,5 Kenyon MR stated that: "I laygreat stress upon the
situation ofthe parties to [the bargain], and the persons who compose the drama",
before proceeding to note that cases involving infants and guardians:
"all proceed on the same general principle, and establish this, that if the
party is in a situation in which he is not a free agent and is not equal to
protecting himself, this court will protect him."6
The underlying theme of protection of the weaker party is reflected in many
cases but perhaps is best exemplified by Fry v. Lane,7 where Lord Kay, in
reviewing the cases said:
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1. See, e.g., Waddams, "Unconscionability in Contracts", [1976]M.L.R. 369 or more generally,
Atiyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979).
2. [1985] I All E.R. 821.
3. See generally on the notion of restraint of trade in the entertainment industry, "Unchained Melody:
Restraint of Trade and Music Contracts", [1992]B.L.R. 223.
4. [1975] Q.B. 326.
5. Evans v. Llewellin (1787) I Cox 334.
6. Ibid., at p. 340.
7. (1888) 50 Ch.D. 312, All E.R. Reprints (l886-90), 1084.
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"the result of the decisions is that where a purchase is made from a poor and
ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, the vendor having no
independent advice, a court of equity will set aside the transaction."8
The tenor of this argument was echoed by Lord Denning, then Master of the
Rolls, some 90 years later when he forcefully propounded a general principle
encompassing the notion of inequality of bargaining power.
Lloyds Bank v. Bundy concerned an elderly farmer who mortgaged his
farmhouse to Lloyds Bank upon their insistence that without this assurance they
would no longer continue to support his son's business. The Assistant Manager
neglected to explain fully the position and possible ramifications of such a charge
being made against the property to Mr Bundy; the son's business later collapsed
and the Bank proceeded to enforce the charge and guarantee. The decision of the
Court of Appeal was based on the finding that there existed a fiduciary duty
between the Bank and the defendant, that there had been a conflict of interest
between the Bank and Mr. Bundy and that the Bank had neglected to inform him
fully of his position. Accordingly, the Bank was not allowed to retain its benefit
from the transaction. Whilst the actual decision rested upon the narrow ground of
undue influence, Lord Denning, having accepted that in the majority of cases a
customer who signs a guarantee is unable to renege upon it,9took the opportunity
to examine those areas where Courts have set contracts aside. LO His analysis rested
upon the fact that having reviewed the situations where the court was prepared to
enquire into a contract, these situations were in fact underpinned by a common
theme:
"Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these instances
there runs a single thread. They rest on 'inequality of bargaining power'. By
virtue of it, the English law gives relief to one who, without independent
advice, enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers
property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his
bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or
desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influences
or pressures brought to bear on him for the benefit of the other." II
The rest of the Court were somewhat more circumspect in their analysis preferring
8. Ibid., at p. 1089.
9. This reflects the traditional reluctance on the pan of the Court to interfere in contractual negotiation:
see, e.g., L 'Estrange v. F. Graucob [1934] 2 K.B. 394.
10. Lord Denning cites at pp. 763-5 contracts being set aside for reason offraud, misrepresentation or
mistake and suggested that there were 5 existing areas where a court would grant relief: "Hitherto those
exceptional cases have been treated each as a separate category in itself' (at p. 763). These categories
were (i) duress of goods; (ii) the unconscionable transaction; (iii) undue influence; (iv) undue pressure;
and (v) salvage agreements.
II. Ibid., at p. 765.
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a narrow interpretation, although Sir Eric Sachs expressed guarded sympathy
with the principle Lord Denning was espousing:
"as regards the wider areas covered in the masterly survey in the judgment of
Lord Denning MR, but not raised arguendo, I do not venture to express an
opinion - though having some sympathy with the views that the courts
should be able to give relief to a party who has been subject to undue
pressure."12
Interestingly, the general theme of Lord Denning's analysis was concurrently
receiving independent judicial support in the House of Lords. Schroeder v.
Macaulayl3 concerned an exclusive publishing agreement made between the
parties in July 1966. In 1970 Macaulay, who at the time of signing the agreement
was 21 years old, sought a declaration that the agreement made was contrary to
public policy and void. The declaration was granted by Plowman J at first instance
and confirmed by the Court of Appeal. In the House of Lords it was left to Lord
Reid to state that:
"The law with regard to the validity of agreements in restraint of trade was
fully considered by this house [in Esso] 14and I do not intend to restate the
principles there set out or to add to or modify what I said myself. I think that
in a case like the present case two questions must be considered. Are the
terms ofthe agreement so restrictive that either they cannot be justified at all
or they must be justified by the party seeking to enforce the agreement?
Then, if there is room for justification, has that party proved justification -
normally by shewing that the restrictions were no more than what was
reasonably required to protect his legitimate interests."15
The agreement itself contained seventeen clauses; the crucial terms relating to
the restraint argument were, inter alia, that:
a) the agreement was to last for a period of 5 years in the first instance but this was
to be extended by another 5 years if the royalties for the first period exceeded
£5000. The royalty sum was in fact minimal and in effect the duration was to all
intents and purposes ten years. As Lord Reid noted:
"The duration of an agreement in restraint of trade is a factor of great
importance in determining whether the restrictions in the agreement can be
justified ... "16
12. Ibid., at p. 771.
13. [1974] 3 All E.R. 616.
14. Esso Petroleum Co. v. Harpers Garage Southport [1968] A.C. 269.
15. Supra n. 13, at p. 618.
16. Ibid., at p. 621.
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b) The songwriter was bound exclusively to the Publisher for this period.
c) The publishers retained the right to terminate the agreement on notice.
Crucially there was no similar right vested in the songwriter.
Lord Reid also refused to read into the contract an agreement to act in good faith
by the appellants; the importance of this being that there was no obligation stated
in the agreement actually to exploit or publish the works in the artist's best'
interests. If the publisher chose not to publish the works, the songwriter was
prevented from plying his trade and his creative output was effectively sterilised.
Looking at the agreement as awhole, Lord Reid held that the agreement was, on
its face, unduly restrictive and that the appellants had not succeeded in justifying
such terms. The argument of Lord Diplock is illuminating in that whilst he
reached the same conclusion, his line of reasoning concentrated on the notion of
'fairness' and that:
"what your Lordships have in fact been doing has been to assess the relative
bargaining power of the publisher and the songwriter at the time the
contract wasmade and to decide whether the publisher had used his superior
bargaining power to exact from the songwriter promises that were unfairly
onerous to him." 17
The affinity with Denning's general approach was further evidenced by his
description of the principle that underpinned the doctrine of restraint of trade:
"the public policy which the court is implementing is not some 19th century
economic theory about the benefit to the general public of freedom of trade,
but the protection of those whose bargaining power is weak against being
forced by those whose bargaining power is stronger to enter into bargains
that are unconscionable."18
With the dust scarcely settled in Schroeder, Lord Denning returned to the
subject in CItfford Davis v. WEA Records .19 He drew comfort from the speeches of
Lords Diplock and Reid,20and argued that both had supported his approach in
Bundy:
"Reading those speeches in the House of Lords, they afford support for the
principles we endeavoured to state at the end of last term about inequality of
bargaining power."21
17. Ibid., at p. 623.
18. Ibid ..
19. (1975] I All E.R. 237.
20. In Schroeder.
21. Clifford Davis, at p. 240.
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Denning addressed the issue of common fairness in preventing the strong
pushing the weak to the wall. He also raised the related issue of independent legal
advice:
"The composer had no lawyer and no legal advisers. It seems to me that, if
the publisher wished to exact such onerous terms or to drive so
unconscionable a bargain, he ought to have seen that the composer had
independent advice."22
A cursory examination at this point might well lead to the conclusion that Lord
Denning's approach was, with the support of the House of Lords, becoming
entrenched despite its relatively short gestation period. However, whilst the three
cases cited above had all stressed the importance of the doctrine of inequality of
bargaining power, the House of Lords returned to a more traditional analysis in
National Westminster Bank v. Morgan.
As with Bundy, the substantive issue was undue influence. Lord Scarman in
delivering the court's judgment, upheld the Bank's contention that there had been
no dominating influence exerted upon Mrs. Morgan and that the transaction itself
was not unfair to her. Having allowed the appeal, Lord Scarman went on to
consider the vexed question of whether the Court of Appeal in Bundy had
accurately stated the law.
Having first approved Sir Eric Sachs narrow interpretation,23 he turned to
consider Denning's argument in favour of the notion of 'inequality of bargaining
power':
"The fact of an unequal bargain will of course be a relevant feature in some
cases of undue influence. But it can never become an appropriate basis of
principle of an equitable doctrine which is concerned with transactions 'not
to be reasonably accounted for on the ground offriendship, relationship, charity,
or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act' (per Lindley J in
Allcard) ... And even in the field of contract I question whether there is any
need in the modern law to erect a general principle of relief against inequality
of bargaining power."24
Lord Scarman's approach was, as Enman notes, consistent with English courts
seeking refuge in laissez faire notions of freedom of contract.25 However, recent
cases following the line ofSchroeder and Clifford Davis, suggest that any writing off
of the doctrine may yet prove to be premature.
22. Ibid., at p. 241.
23. This narrow analysis followed the reasoning of Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch. 145.
24. National Westminster v. Morgan, at p. 830.
25. Enman, "Doctrines of Unconscionability in England, Canada and the Commonwealth", [1987]
Anglo-American Law Rev. at p. 202.
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The recent music cases
The points raised by Schroeder resurfaced in the Court of Appeal in ZTT Records
and Another v. Holly Johnson.26 Here there was both a publishing and
recording agreement at stake. The issue for the court was whether the
agreements signed by the respondent were unenforceable as an unreasonable
restraint of trade. The caseconcerned agreements made in 1983and 1984between
the members of the band 'Frankie goes to Hollywood' and the directors of ZTT
Records and Perfect Songs Publishing Ltd., the directors and shareholders in both
of these being Trevor Horn and Jill Sinclair.
The contract provided that the band was, in the first instance, to be bound to the
two companies, both individually and collectively, for a period of seven months
(Clause 3). However, the clause itself reserved the right of the Company to
exercise a series of options; Clause 3.2 providing that
"[the] artist irrevocably grants to [the] company options to extend the term
of this agreement for 2 separate and successive option periods and 5 separate
and successive contract periods."
The periods themselves were to be the longer of 12calendar months or 120days
after the delivery of the minimum recording commitmentY Thus whilst on the
face of it the term was 7 months, by exercising the option periods under the
contract the band could be tied to the Company for a period of 8 to 9 years.
Further to this the contract provided that if any new member was to join the
band he or she would be deemed to be bound by the terms of the agreement; and
that if any member chose to leave the band the company reserved the right to
contract that individual into a separate agreement on the same terms and
conditions as the first agreement.
The duration of the term and the provisions relating to new and leaving
members were sufficient for Dillon LJ to find that "the recording agreement as a
whole is unenforceable because it is an unreasonable restraint of trade. "28
However, whilst the analysis of the case can be based on a logical extension of the
doctrine of restraint of trade from the publishing agreements ofSchroeder and into
the lucrative area of recording agreements, Dillon LJ's arguments owe much to
the reasoning of Lord Diplock in the same case. Aswas noted above, Lord Diplock
based his analysis of the situation in Schroeder on whether the contract was fair.
There was no evidence of undue influence on the part of Horn or Sinclair in the
present case but, as Dillon LJ put it:
26. Independent Law Reports, 2 August 1989.
27. The minimum recording commitments and option periods are specified in Gause 4.1.
28. Court of Appeal Transcript, 26 July 1989, at p. 12. .
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"What is said is that the terms of the recording agreement and publishing
agreement put forward by the recording company and the publishing company,
even after such concessions asweremade during the negotiations, were soone
sided and unfair that consistently with the principles applied by the House
of Lords [in Schroeder] they cannot stand and cannot be enforced against the
defendant. "29
Thus whilst the casecan be confined to the strict restraint of trade argument, the
reasoning employed by Dillon LJ relies to a great extent on the notion of inequality
of bargaining power alluded to by Lord Diplock and championed by Lord
Denning in Bundy. Also noted within the decision are the relative positions of the
parties; the importance of this was emphasised by the High Court in an unreported
case concerning 'The Stone Roses'. 30
'The Stone Roses' case concerned both a recording and publishing agreement
made between the parties in April 1988. In finding that the agreement was indeed
unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint of trade, Judge Humphries found
certain terms to be crucial.
i) Duration
The band was tied to the Companies for a minimum of 7 years. However, by the
operation of an alternative option calculation the term would, if later, expire 9
months after the release of the minimum recording required in the United States.
There was no obligation to release any of the band's material in the U.S. and the
band could have been tied to the label indefinitely.
ii) Exclusivity
Byclause 4 of the agreement, Zomba had the exclusive and sole right to exploit the
Stone Roses' recordings. The decision as to the reproduction, distribution or
release of the product rested solely with Zomba. The band was also forbidden to
render any performances where there existed a possibility of recording and future
manufacture and release.
iii) Territory
As the Judge noted, 'the world and its solar system' could hardly have been more
extensive.
Whilst those terms in particular and the agreement as awhole led to a finding of
an unreasonable restraint of trade, Judge Humphries comments regarding the
relative bargaining powers make interesting reading. The solicitor used by the
manager of The Stone Roses was Geoffrey Howard, about whom Judge
Humphries said:
29. Ibid., at p. 3.
30. Silvertone Records v. Mountfield & Drs, Zomba Music v. Mountfield & Drs (unreported) 20 May
1991.
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"Mr. Howard may well be and may well have been competent in many parts
of a solicitor's work, but he was not, and nor did Mr. Evans or the plaintiffs
ever believe him to be, an experienced music lawyer."31
Having described Mr. Furman, the plaintiffs lawyer, as an experienced
barrister with considerable expertise in the field ofmusic contracts, he went on to
describe the wider role of the music lawyer:
" ... the services of a music lawyer in contracts such as the one in
consideration is not as in many contracts simply to explain the legal meaning
to clients and to ensure where appropriate that the contract is representing
what the client wants. Within the entertainment industry, or at any rate the
subject I am considering, music lawyers go much further. They need the
expertise to appreciate many of the terms, something of the state of the
market, the state of the law on restraint and entertainment contracts, which
in recent years has been developing rapidly. Music lawyers habitually get
involved in negotiations and know where it is right to and where they are able
to put pressure on the other side so as to thrash out an agreement which is
fair to both sides. Mr. Howard had none of this expertise. He had I doubt
ever heard of the Holly Johnson case and I am sure he had no appreciation
whatever what it was all about, and am quite satisfied he was no match
whatever for the expertise and experience on the plaintiffs side."32
Whilst this case too withstands a strict analysis in terms of restraint of trade, the
reasoning again rests on the relative bargaining power of the parties. Had the
plaintiffs recommended that Mr. Evans seek specialist independent advice before
signing the contract the outcome may well have been significantly different. As it
was, the plaintiffs superiors themselves on hearing of the terms ofthe agreement
that had been signed expressed concern that the lack of substantial negotiation
could render the contract unenforceable.
Conclusion
The immediate ramifications of these decisions on the music and entertainment
industries seems uncontroversial; contracts made without recourse to specialist
independent advice which contain unduly restrictive terms may be subject to
legal scrutiny. The Music Industry will no doubt take heed of these warnings and
conduct their negotiations accordingly. Whether this heralds a resurrection of a
general principle of unconscionability, based on inequality of bargaining power,
appears to be more problematic.
31. Transcript of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, 20 May 1991, at p. 33.
32. Ibid., at pp. 33-34.
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Certainly the courts appear to be considering the fairness of contracts and the
circumstances surrounding the making of such a contract, but this must be seen
against the enmity exhibited by Lord Scarman towards a general principle. What
does seem apparent is that whilst the development of Lord Denning's principle
may have been headed off in a limited range of cases through the Morgan decision,
the seeds sown by Lord Diplock in Schroeder and Lord Denning in CLIfford Davis
have found fertile ground within the doctrine of restraint of trade and may prove
far more difficult to suppress.
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